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INTRODUCTION
In September 2010, the Arctic experienced its "third-lowest recorded [sea ice extent] since 1979…overall, the 2010 minimum was 31% lower than the 1979-2000 average." 1 Whether one subscribes to global warming or climate change or not it is hard to dismiss that the physical characteristics of the Arctic are not just changing, but shifting to a different state. As such, human access to and activity in the Arctic region, in the form of nation-state endeavors, commerce, and tourism, continue to increase at an accelerated rate, quickly posing national security challenges for the U.S. and other Arctic countries. 2 With this increased interest and activity the question arises as to what diplomatic conflict, environmental crisis, or humanitarian disaster is primed to explode in the Arctic region and is the United States best prepared to effectively respond in a timely manner.
In today"s environment there are two recurring themes that continuously appear in every major U.S. domestic and international contingency. First, no one can go it alone;
everyone requires some form of support from another agency, organization, and/or country.
Second, resources really are finite, especially given the world economic and financial crisis.
As such, every organization and agency must work efficiently and effectively to achieve its objectives in support of the greater national security strategy. 3 The United States" future in the Arctic can best be served by acknowledging this interdependency and, more importantly, by taking action well before a crisis, to formally establish a government structure that brings all appropriate forces to bear regarding the full spectrum of contingencies. As such, the United States should establish a Joint Interagency Task Force-Polar North (JIATF-PN) for each of its three Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) that encompass the Arctic in order to safeguard and promote U.S. sovereignty and interests in the region.
Establishing a JIATF-PN in NORTHCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM enables the United States to achieve maximum unity of effort through the "whole of government" approach while optimizing span of control; allows for effective and efficient balancing of space, time, and force in the Arctic region; and best promotes U.S. interests with minimal impact to international relations. This paper will utilize historic cases that support the JIATF construct for use by the GCCs in the Arctic region. This paper will not attempt to evaluate or analyze capacity or capability shortfalls in detail.
Immediate objections to the proposed construct for creating multiple JIATFs within the existing Unified Command framework revolve around two differently held views. The first view advocates the status quo and objects to the notion of creating a JIATF based on the numerous existing government agencies, bilateral agreements, and international organizations with Arctic responsibilities; that creating a JIATF would be "just another organization" that duplicated the work already being done in the region.
The second view, and probably the one with the greatest number of skeptics regarding the proposed construct, advocates for one JIATF within one GCC. These skeptics believe that the best way to manage the Arctic region is by achieving unity of command through one regional commander, and would immediately identify that the proposed construct in this paper violates the fundamental principle of unity of command.
While these are reasonable arguments it will be shown throughout the paper that they fail to consider the Arctic region in the greater context of maritime domestic crisis management and the politics of the international arena. That while their proposed courses of actions may appear to offer solutions to the Arctic problem, they in fact escalate the situation by neglecting to consider the importance of managing and balancing span of control and unity of command.
MAXIMUM UNITY OF EFFORT
Establishing a JIATF-PN in NORTHCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM will enable the United States to achieve maximum unity of effort through the "whole of government" approach while optimizing span of control. Agency and National Science Foundation shall coordinate with "other heads of relevant departments and agencies" to implement these six objectives. 4 These six objectives contain numerous sub-objectives that range from missile defense, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, maritime domain awareness, law enforcement, preventing terrorist attacks, promoting freedom of navigation to studying climate change, protecting the environment, pollution prevention and response, search and rescue (SAR) cooperation, and maritime commerce initiatives. However, no priority of the objectives or sub-objectives is stated in the Directive.
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Though there are interagency working groups at the national level to align policy with strategy there is no general requirement for cooperation or interagency coordination at the operational-combatant command and tactical levels. Combatant commands do have Joint
Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) and the ability to stand-up JIATFs, but membership of interagencies is determined by each combatant command, and interagencies are not obligated to participate. 6 This results in organizations and agencies, at the operational and operational-tactical levels, agreeing to support one another by way of memorandums of understandings (MOUs) and "hand-shakes." However, this informal construct does not work well for crisis management and operations involving multiple and overlapping jurisdictions. Culture, biases, resources, and specific mission focus often prevent effective coordination and cooperation.
For instance, when the earthquake struck Haiti in early 2010, President Obama stated the U.S. would respond with a "whole of government" approach and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) would have the lead. 7 However, the U.S. response, though eventually effective, was not efficient in responding to the catastrophe, which happened only 500 miles from U.S. soil. Even after two weeks the U.S. government response was struggling. What was revealed was the lack of interagency policy and planning before a crisis, the need for common doctrine and standard operating procedures, and clearly defined "objectives, roles, responsibilities, and authorities" by the lead agency for the supporting organizations and agencies. 8 The Haiti response is not an isolated case of the U.S Government"s (USG) inefficiency in managing the difficulties and intricacies associated with interagency cooperation. Even highly successful interagency organizations, such as Joint interagency Task Force -Counter Terrorism (JIATF-CT) and Joint Interagency Task Force -South (JIATF-S), are plagued with similar faults and flaws regarding their constructs that have inhibited, at times, their performance and ability to maximize unity of effort.
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These examples and cases demonstrate common tenets regarding interagency coordination. Specifically, the need for common, prioritized, agreed upon objectives that support the greater national security objectives; the need to codify by Presidential Directive or law for the establishment of JIATFs as well as to mandate participation by organizations and agencies; the need to vest the authority in the heads of JIATFs to manage the mission and people; and the need to adopt best practices, doctrine, and standard operating procedures.
According to Dr. Milan Vego, the joint operational warfare theorist, the "main requirements for the sound functioning of a command organization are centralized direction and decentralized execution, a high degree of jointness, and interoperability." 10 Establishing JIATF-PNs that incorporate these common tenets not only meets the requirements for a sound functioning command organization, but it all but achieves unity of command.
With respect to the U.S. Arctic Policy, which specifically identifies the diverse, multiple departments and agencies responsible for overseeing the implementation of specific policy objectives, it is easy to see the need to formally establish a mechanism that codifies cooperation and coordination at a level that is more than just a "hand-shake", MOU, or
However, what is not immediately apparent is the need for three JIATFs. 
SPACE, TIME, & FORCE BALANCE
According to Vego, …the art of warfare is to obtain and maintain freedom of action -the ability to carry out critically important, multiple, and diverse decisions to accomplish assigned military objectives, [and that] one"s freedom of action is achieved primarily by properly balancing the factors of space, time, and forces. Though the Arctic Ocean is the smallest and shallowest ocean in the world, and even with the recent melting and the partial opening of sea lanes throughout the region, these facts do not simplify the balancing of space, time, and force. 15 The extreme weather and day/night cycles as well as lack of regional infrastructure and support facilities essentially amount to the Arctic being one of the most demanding spaces in which to conduct operations. 16 There is little that can be done to change the harsh physical characteristics of the Arctic space. However, the Arctic space can be managed through the factors of time and
force. Since time is continuous, and time "lost can never be regained" the factor of force becomes the primary means in balancing space, time, and force.
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Forces that are properly equipped, trained, sized, integrated, procedurally aligned, and mission oriented are critical to successful operations. 18 Currently, the U.S. does not possess the land, sea, and air capabilities and infrastructure to properly support its Arctic policy. 19 According to a Congressional Research Services report, a former District 17 Coast Guard Admiral, and the U.S. Navy"s Arctic Roadmap there are significant shortcomings with respect to homeland security and defense, law enforcement, Search and Rescue operations, maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, oil spill response, and infrastructure to support and sustain Arctic operations in western and northern Alaska. 20 All stress the need to coordinate and integrate efforts. A July 2010 report by the Oceanographer of the Navy stated, "to meet the demands of national security in the changing northern environment, strengthening mechanisms for cooperation among…U.S. agencies must remain a high priority." 21 All of these support the concept of managing the space through combined force management.
There is danger in the U.S. not taking a collective approach at the operational and operational-tactical levels in managing forces with respect to its Arctic policy. For instance, the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico required nearly three months of emergency operations to stop the free flow of oil into the ocean waters. Numerous federal, state, and local government agencies, including the U.S. military, as well as several commercial industries were involved in these emergency operations. The event occurred in relatively warm waters near the heart of the offshore oil industry"s infrastructure and support network. 22 If an event of this magnitude were to occur in the Arctic Ocean there is a high probability given the remoteness, lack of infrastructure, and response capabilities that a runaway well could not be stopped. Essentially, response time would be of an astronomical magnitude given the complexity of the space and lack for force.
Furthermore, something as simple as the incident involving the cruise ship SPLENDOR, which was disabled off the coast of Mexico in November 2010, only 150 miles south of San Diego, required three Coast Guard cutters, a Navy aircraft carrier, and a civilian tug service to execute rescue operations. 23 There is nothing in place in the Arctic to conduct these types of rescue operations, either independently or jointly. Those individuals playing the odds of something catastrophic happening only need to consider the fate of the cruise ship EXPLORER, which, in 2007, struck a growler and sank in the Antarctic Ocean. 24 Fortunately, there was an additional cruise ship in the area that was quickly able to render assistance. If this had not been the case there is a high probability, given the harshness and cold water of the Antarctic Ocean, significant loss of life would have occurred. Even homeland security issues are in play in the Arctic. Canadian officials, for instance, highlight a 2007 incident involving a Norwegian yacht with known criminals onboard who were forbidden to enter Canada. This yacht was able to sail three-quarters of the Northwest Passage (NWP) and was not noticed until making landfall. For Canadian officials, this underscored the gaps in not only Arctic maritime domain awareness, but in the lack of assets and people to respond. 25 This scenario is applicable to the U.S. and raises the question of whether illegal immigration, terrorists, and narcotics smugglers will have another direction in which to enter the United States.
These scenarios highlight the importance of economizing forces in order to better manage a space. This coordination of the forces is critical, especially given the fiscal constraints and financial crisis occurring in the United States and throughout the world over the last several of years. Instituting JIATF-PNs not only optimizes force employment from a mission stand point, it also saves taxpayers from having to fund duplicate assets within multiple agencies for overlapping missions.
Opponents to creating any type of JIATF cite the existence of numerous international and domestic organizations and agencies with responsibilities and interests associated with the Arctic. These opponents believe that the Arctic can be managed within the existing international and domestic framework. There are currently fourteen international organizations that operate in the Arctic. These organizations have various ranges of focus, including military cooperation on sunken and discarded Russian naval reactors, SAR coordination, scientific research, environmental management and response, and indigenous population protection. 26 The most influential of these organizations is the Arctic Council, established in 1996 by the eight Arctic states as a high level forum. The purpose of the Arctic Council is to address "cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states" with particular emphasis on issues pertaining to "sustainable development and environmental protection." 27 The U.S. was adamant about not expanding the role, especially with respect to security, and authority of the Arctic Council. 28 Furthermore, all five of the Arctic coastal states further declared in the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 that they are all committed to resolving Arctic issues peacefully, through the currently existing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) structure and are unanimously against establishing "a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean." 29 However, the U.S.
credibility with respect to its commitment to UNCLOS is not as strong as it could be given that the U.S. is the only Arctic nation that has yet to ratify the treaty. Essentially, while the international organizations are useful in promoting cooperation and coordination with respect to SAR, environmental protection and response, and scientific research they do not equate to security for the U.S., nor should the U.S. entrust such security to others. There is no perfect solution to arranging the boundaries of a GCC"s area of responsibility. Though a problem may be solved by redrawing boundaries and/or shifting responsibility of the countries within those boundaries amongst different GCCs it no doubt creates friction or problems at different junctures within the newly created construct. This is not to say that boundaries and geographical structures of the existing GCCs should not be redrawn, but only to highlight that no problem is linear and that everything is connectedsolutions to problems must be looked at in the greater context. For example, Pakistan (CENTCOM) and India (PACOM) are in separate GCCs to prevent a single GCC from being "caught" between the feuding that occurs between the two countries. Egypt is part of CENTCOM versus AFRICOM because of its close ties to the Middle Eastern countries as well as to serve as a balance to Israel with respect to military assistance. 33 These examples highlight the importance of relationships versus the physical location when deciding GCC boundaries. The point being that leaving the GCC boundaries which separate the Arctic amongst three GCCs would not be a new practice, and that geographical boundaries must be weighed in relation to geographical politics.
With regard to the Arctic region, one would think that it would be most beneficial to the United States to place the entire region under one GCC and/or one JIATF or sub-Unified
Command. While this may appear to frame the Arctic problem into an easier context to manage from a U.S. perspective, it fails to address broader, more strategic aspects of global politics and security. For instance, when AFRICOM was established in 2008 as a standalone command many African nations viewed its establishment in a negative light, seeing it as an act of colonialism and unilateralism on the United States behalf. 34 It has taken several years of intense interaction and cooperation to build trust with African nations that held this belief. Apparently, the creation of AFRICOM had different strategic communication effects than intended by the United States, highlighting a faulty assumption on the United States" part.
If the U.S. were to redraw and reorganize its GCCs so that the Arctic fell under one GCC there is a high probability that the Arctic nations as well as nations from around the world would view this as a move by the U.S. to assert hegemony in the region. This would be especially true if NORTHCOM controlled the entire Arctic region. Whereas the establishment of JIATF-PNs within the existing UCP framework would be viewed in a less threatening manner since it equates to managing the region versus consolidating the region under one GCC. A newly created unified Arctic sub-command and/or the consolidation of the Arctic in to one GCC would produce second and third order effects that run contrary to U.S. objectives in the region.
For instance, the Russian Federation, which already feels insecure regarding NATO and other U.S. initiatives, would likely view the consolidation of the Arctic region under one GCC as a threat to its national interest, potentially tipping off a greater military policy and presence in the Arctic which could erode other current initiatives in the region pertaining to international security and cooperation. 35 The Arctic region is of vital national security interest to the Russian Federation, given that its economy is heavily tied to the region. "As much as 20 percent of Russia"s gross domestic product (GDP) and 22 percent of the total Russian export is generated north of the Arctic Circle." 36 Additionally, Russia already has 20 ice breakers, seven of which are nuclear powered, making it the largest fleet in the world by at least a dozen ice breakers. 37 Russia continues to modernize its naval fleet, and has "eight fourth-generation Borei-class ballistic missile submarines planned to be completed by 2015"
as well as well as aspirations to field "5 to 6 aircraft carrier squadrons…." 38 importantly, what it does and how that action is interpreted by the international community.
CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS
As this paper is being finalized, the President of the United States issued a change to the UCP in which PACOM was relieved of all Arctic responsibilities, effectively leaving EUCOM and NORTHCOM with overseeing the Arctic region. 39 While this change will likely simplify and increase U.S. efficiencies in managing the Arctic, its impact, specifically with respect to strategic communication, is unknown since it is still in its infancy. However, there is one immediate and interesting issue that presents itself with respect to the new UCP geographical boundaries. In the former UCP, all three GCCs, EUCOM, NORTHCOM, and PACOM, shared the North Pole as a common boundary. The new UCP not only removes PACOM from the Arctic region, but its boundaries are redrawn as such that the entire North Pole, including approximately 300 miles in circumference, are placed in NORTHCOM"s area of responsibility. This is interesting since the Russian Federation has attempted to claim, unsuccessfully, the seabed beneath the North Pole as an extension of their continental shelf.
However, the Russian Federation is still pursuing this claim and is in the process of resubmitting their claim to the United Nations. 40 It is highly probable that the Russian
Federation will see this redrawing of the GCC"s geographic boundaries as a move by the U.S., which believes the Russian Federation"s claim as excessive and not in accordance with UNCLOS guidance regarding continental shelf extensions, as a means to further challenge Russian Federation claims to the North Pole. It is also highly probable that the U.S. wanted
to send just such a message. However, the strategic effects of such a message remain to be seen in the Arctic region and throughout other regions of the world.
Regardless of the new UCP, the arguments presented in this paper regarding the creation of multiple JIATF-PNs remains unchanged, though the proposed construct will require two versus three commands. Creating a JIATF-Polar North in each of the GCCs with Arctic responsibilities presents the optimum solution to the U.S. Arctic dilemma. These
JIATFs will synchronize the U.S. military and government agencies efforts in planning and executing responses to Arctic crisis within a manageable span of control framework, optimize forces by concentrating resources and capabilities, as well as serve as liaison centers for both Arctic and non-Arctic countries with interests in the region. Any attempts to solve the Arctic dilemma by placing it under one GCC or JIATF neglects those Arctic Nations that have strong security, economic, and human ties and interests to the region, and strategically communicates a message of Arctic militarization opposed to one of cooperation.
To ensure its success in the Arctic, the United States should implement the following:
The United States government should direct the establishment and participants in the JIATF-PNs either through Presidential directives or legislation. This will ensure the operational level of governance and execution is best prepared and equipped to effectively and efficiently execute national policy. 41 Simply establishing the JIATF-PNs without higher level mandates will not provide the necessary authorities to align organizations and agencies with common procedures, doctrines, and objectives. Furthermore, mandating JIATF-PNs will allow the budgetary process, specifically with respect to Arctic capabilities and assets, to be addressed as a whole.
Finally, the United States should become a full member of the UNCLOS by having
Congress ratify the treaty. This recommendation has been suggested by numerous high level government officials in the past, including the President, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of Coast Guard. 42 By ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. will communicate through action versus words, of its commitment to use the United Nations as the source for resolving maritime affairs. Additionally, by becoming a full member of the UNCLOS, the U.S. will be able to challenge and submit requests for continental shelf extensions, perhaps gaining increased access to vital natural resources.
Through the implementation of these two recommendations, JIATF-PNs will be the conduit that bridges the gaps between the strategic level of governance and the tactical level of execution regarding current and future Arctic objectives and operations. 3. For example, responses to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Hurricane KATRINA all required the 'whole of government' approach. All required the specific skills and authorities of one another to execute and achieve the objectives and desired end-state at the national/strategic level. Without this 'whole of government' approach, these operations and responses would not have been possible. The complexity of major operations, in today's world, frequently requires cooperation amongst multiple services, agencies, organizations, and the international community to successfully execute. 9. Another example that illustrates lack of interagency planning was the Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010. According to Admiral Thad Allen, "the biggest lesson learned from this and other disasters is that it's important to make sure all of the different branches and levels of government are working together," and the need for agencies to adopt higher level objectives versus their agencies objectives as well as standard operating procedures during a crisis. Both Haiti and the Gulf of Mexico oil spill reinforce the U.S. government's failure to plan, coordinate, and cooperate effectively and efficiently before and during operations in support of national policy objectives. Furthermore, JIATF-CT and JIATF-S, despite being highly successful regarding interagency cooperation, experienced problems with their organizational construct. JIATF-CTs were established by each of the GCC's following the September 11th attacks to jointly process intelligence and interrogate suspected terrorists. These JIATF-CTs later evolved "from an operation-specific task force to a comprehensive JIACG better to wage the long-term war on terrorism." However, despite their success, several faults and flaws with the construct of these JIACG exists. Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, one of the original designers and users of the JIACG concept, cites the "lack of a single, national-level organization issuing guidance, managing competing agency policies, and directing agency participation in JIACGs" as a major inhibitor to achieving unity of effort. Bogdanos goes on to say that planning needs to occur both simultaneously and horizontally at all levels. JIATF-S, located in Key West, Florida, was established in 1994 as a Department of Defense (DOD) command to facilitate the employment of DOD capabilities to support U.S. law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat drugs. JIATF-S success has been associated with its integrated command structure, which includes members of different agencies filling key influential director and deputy positions, a clear mission statement, common standard operating procedures, and their ability to control assets assigned. However, despite their success, participation by agencies is determined by way of MOUs, which according to a comprehensive paper that surveyed interagency policies and practices across a multiple of disciplines, required time for agencies to "build trust." J. J. What does the Arctic have to offer and why is there a potential for friction and conflict in the region? The answer is money and opportunity, and the potential for more of both. Unlike Antarctica, in which countries have claimed portions of the continent, but do not truly own, the Arctic land masses are already the sovereign territory of the Arctic countries, which affords them rights and privileges, including access to fisheries, oil, natural gas, and minerals, within their established Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, there are boundary and territorial disputes between several of the Arctic coastal states. These disputes are fueled by the potential for certain Arctic coastal states to gain additional territory and/or more favorable borders which will expand their EEZs, essentially allowing greater access to additional natural resources along the Arctic sea bed.
There are currently three actively disputed maritime boundaries and territories in the Finally, the opening of the Arctic allows for three potential short-cuts in maritime trade routes: Over the top, the Northwest Passage (NWP), and Northern Sea Route (NSR).
The over the top route will not be discussed given that its use involves uncontested waters.
The NWP connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by way of a route over North America.
The NSR connects the Atlantic and Pacific by way of a route over Asia and Europe. A trip from Europe to Asia is 4,700 miles shorter by way of the NWP than the Panama Canal. Hope. 9 It is easy to see how these maritime trade routes become more appealing as the Arctic continues to melt and facilitate passage. However, both Canada, with respect to the NWP, and the Russian Federation, with respect to the NSR, claim that portions of these routes are in fact internal waters, and thus are subject to their jurisdiction. The United States as well as several other European and world nations view the passages as international waters, and, as such, apply freedom of navigation and transit passage. 
